Daf 30a
הָתָם נָמֵי שֶׁהִקְטִיר קוֹמֶץ מִנְחָה חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ קוֹמֶץ לְבוֹנָה חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ
הֲרֵי קוֹמֶץ דְּמִנְחַת חוֹטֵא דְּלֵיכָּא לְבוֹנָה בַּהֲדֵיהּ וּפְלִיגִי
לָא פְּלִיגִי אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר פְּלִיגִי פְּלִיגִי בִּפְסִיעוֹת
רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי מַתְנֵי כִּדְאַבָּיֵי רַב הוּנָא בַּר נָתָן מַתְנֵי כִּדְרָבָא
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אֲמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּשִׁיטַת רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֲמָרָהּ דְּאָמַר תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן
דִּתְנַן אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה זֶה הַכְּלָל אִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה אֶת מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם פִּיגּוּל וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת
הֲרֵי קְמִיצָה דִּ(לְ)כִי לַחֲצוֹת דָּמֵי וּפְלִיגִי
אִין רֵישָׁא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת סֵיפָא בֵּין בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת בֵּין בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת
תְּנַן אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה זֶה הַכְּלָל אִם מַחְשֶׁבֶת הַזְּמַן קָדְמָה לְמַחְשֶׁבֶת הַמָּקוֹם פִּיגּוּל וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי זֶה הַכְּלָל אֶלָּא לְאִילְפָא מַאי זֶה הַכְּלָל קַשְׁיָא
תְּנַן הָתָם הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אִם לְכָךְ נִתְכַּוֵּון תְּחִילָּה הוֹאִיל וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהוֹצִיא שְׁתֵּי שֵׁמוֹת כְּאַחַת דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין וְאִם מִשֶּׁאָמַר הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וְנִמְלַךְ וְאָמַר הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים הֲרֵי זוֹ עוֹלָה
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה וּשְׁלָמִים מַהוּ לַחֲצוֹת מַהוּ
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי בְּהָא וַדַּאי מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר רָבָא אֲמַר עֲדַיִין הִיא מַחְלוֹקֶת
אָמַר רָבָא לְאַבָּיֵי לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ בְּהָא וַדַּאי מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר הֲרֵי שְׁחִיטָה דִּ(לְ)כִי לַחֲצוֹת דָּמֵי וּפְלִיגִי
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מִי סָבְרַתְּ אֵינָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף יֶשְׁנָהּ לִשְׁחִיטָה מִתְּחִילָּה וְעַד סוֹף וּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ דְּאָמַר סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ סִימָן שֵׁנִי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ
— Even so: the first clause treats of two services, while the second clause can refer to either one service or two services. We learnt: SAID R. JUDAH: THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE INTENTION OF TIME PRECEDED THE INTENTION OF PLACE, IT IS PIGGUL, AND INVOLVES KARETH. As for R. Johanan. it is well: hence he teaches, THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE. (1) But according to Ilfa, what is the implication of THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE? — That is indeed a difficulty. We learnt elsewhere: [If one declares.] ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ it is a substitute for a burnt-offering [only]: this is R. Meir's view. Said R. Jose: If such was his original intention, (2) since it is impossible to pronounce both designations simultaneously, his declarations are valid. (3) But if, having declared, ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering,’ he declared as an afterthought, ‘This be a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ it is a burnt-offering. It was asked: What if [one declares,] ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offerings,’ [or] ‘[This animal be a substitute for] half [a burnt-offering] and half [a peace-offering]’? Said Abaye: Here R. Meir certainly agrees [with R. Jose]. Raba said: There is still the controversy. Raba said to Abaye: According to you who maintain that here R. Meir certainly agrees, Yet lo! slaughtering is analogous to half and half, yet they disagree? (4) — Said he to him: Do you think that shechitah counts only at the end? [No:] Shechitah counts from the beginning until the end , and our Mishnah means that he declared [that he cut] one organ [intending to eat the flesh] after time and the second organ [intending to eat it] without bounds. (5) Yet surely kemizah (6) is analogous to halves, yet they disagree? (7) — There too it means that he burnt a fistful of the mealoffering [with the intention of eating] after time and a fistful of the frankincense [intending to eat] without bounds. Yet they disagree in respect of the fistful of a sinner's meal-offering, where there is no frankincense? — They do not disagree there. R. Ashi said: If you should say that they do disagree, they disagree in the steps. (8) R. Shimi b. Ashi recited [the passage] as Abaye; R. Huna b. Nathan recited [it] as Raba. When R. Dimi came, (9) he said: R. Meir stated [his ruling] in accordance with the thesis of R. Judah, who maintained: Regard the first expression. For we learnt: R. JUDAH SAID, THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE INTENTION OF TIME PRECEDED THE INTENTION OF PLACE, IT IS PIGGUL, AND INVOLVES KARETH.
(1). ↑ This phrase is always regarded as including something not explicitly stated; according to R. Johanan then it includes the case of both intentions being expressed at one service.
(2). ↑ To declare it a substitute for both.
(3). ↑ V. Lev. XXVII, 33: He shall not inquire whether it be good or bad, neither shall he change it; and if he change it at all, then both it and that for which it is changed shall be holy. This is interpreted as meaning that if an animal is dedicated for a particular sacrifice, e.g., a peaceofferings, and then a second is substituted for it, both are holy, the second having exactly the same holiness as the first. Now R. Meir rules that if he declares it a substitute for two consecrated animals in succession, only the first declaration is valid, and the second is disregarded. But R. Jose maintains that if the second statement was not added as an afterthought but was part of the original intention, the whole is valid. Consequently, the animal is put out to graze until it receives a blemish, when it must be sold, and the money expended half for a burnt-offering and half for a peace-offering.
(4). ↑ When one slaughters the sacrifice with the intention of eating as much as an olive without bounds and as much as an olive after time, the second intention is not an afterthought cancelling the first, since both are possible; yet R. Judah regards the first statement only. This is analogous to making an animal a substitute for half a burntoffering and half a peace-offerings, for here too both are possible. Now R. Meir who regards the first statement only in substitution agrees with R. Judah in our Mishnah, and therefore in the declaration in question too he should regard the first statement only.
(5). ↑ Shechitah consists of cutting across the two organs of the throat, viz., the windpipe and the gullet. Here R. Judah disagrees, because he regards them as two separate statements; but in a statement of ‘halves’ R. Judah (and R. Meir) would agree that the whole counts as one statement and that both parts are regarded. V. also Pes. (Sonc. ed.) p. 315, n. 3.
(6). ↑ V. Glos.
(7). ↑ If the priest takes the fistful of the mealoffering for burning on the altar while expressing the intention of eating as much as an olive after time and as much as an olive without bounds. There is the same controversy in Men. 12a between R. Judah and the Sages as here.
(8). ↑ As the priest took one step while carrying the fistful to the altar he declared his intention of partaking of the offering without bounds, and as he took another step, his intention of partaking thereof after time. Hence here also we have two separate statements.
(9). ↑ From Palestine to Babylon.
(1). ↑ This phrase is always regarded as including something not explicitly stated; according to R. Johanan then it includes the case of both intentions being expressed at one service.
(2). ↑ To declare it a substitute for both.
(3). ↑ V. Lev. XXVII, 33: He shall not inquire whether it be good or bad, neither shall he change it; and if he change it at all, then both it and that for which it is changed shall be holy. This is interpreted as meaning that if an animal is dedicated for a particular sacrifice, e.g., a peaceofferings, and then a second is substituted for it, both are holy, the second having exactly the same holiness as the first. Now R. Meir rules that if he declares it a substitute for two consecrated animals in succession, only the first declaration is valid, and the second is disregarded. But R. Jose maintains that if the second statement was not added as an afterthought but was part of the original intention, the whole is valid. Consequently, the animal is put out to graze until it receives a blemish, when it must be sold, and the money expended half for a burnt-offering and half for a peace-offering.
(4). ↑ When one slaughters the sacrifice with the intention of eating as much as an olive without bounds and as much as an olive after time, the second intention is not an afterthought cancelling the first, since both are possible; yet R. Judah regards the first statement only. This is analogous to making an animal a substitute for half a burntoffering and half a peace-offerings, for here too both are possible. Now R. Meir who regards the first statement only in substitution agrees with R. Judah in our Mishnah, and therefore in the declaration in question too he should regard the first statement only.
(5). ↑ Shechitah consists of cutting across the two organs of the throat, viz., the windpipe and the gullet. Here R. Judah disagrees, because he regards them as two separate statements; but in a statement of ‘halves’ R. Judah (and R. Meir) would agree that the whole counts as one statement and that both parts are regarded. V. also Pes. (Sonc. ed.) p. 315, n. 3.
(6). ↑ V. Glos.
(7). ↑ If the priest takes the fistful of the mealoffering for burning on the altar while expressing the intention of eating as much as an olive after time and as much as an olive without bounds. There is the same controversy in Men. 12a between R. Judah and the Sages as here.
(8). ↑ As the priest took one step while carrying the fistful to the altar he declared his intention of partaking of the offering without bounds, and as he took another step, his intention of partaking thereof after time. Hence here also we have two separate statements.
(9). ↑ From Palestine to Babylon.
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